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INTRODUCTION 
The brief that Plaintiff/Appellee, Oletta Cummings, has 
submitted to this Court focuses intently on the fact that 
Defendant/Appellant, Clyde Kay Cummings, has not referred this 
Court to his deposition testimony in marshalling the evidence. 
Plaintiff fails to point out, however, that nowhere in the 
trial court record is there any indication whatsoever that the 
depositions of Mr. Cummings were ever filed with the court. The 
depositions are not part of the trial court's record and there is 
no evidence of any pleading, transmittal letter, or transcribed 
proceeding demonstrating that the depositions were filed with the 
trial court. 
Under the controlling precedent of this Court, the failure 
to file depositions with the trial court, even if formally 
published, precludes their consideration on appeal. Accordingly, 
Mr. Cummings has no burden to marshal information that is not 
part of the record before this Court as it is not evidence which 
the trial court considered. 
Therefore, the only evidence presented to the trial court 
and reviewable by this Court is the transcript of the evidentiary 
hearing before Judge Iwasaki. Defendant Cummings has met his 
burden to marshal the evidence with respect to the evidence in 
the trial court record and thoroughly discussed and demonstrated 
in his initial brief the wholly inadequate basis for the court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
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Given the failure of Plaintiff to file the depositions with 
the trial court and Defendant's sufficient and detailed 
marshalling of the evidence to this Court,i7 Defendant Cummings 
urges this Court to decide his appeal without oral argument. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Mr. Cummings Has Met His Burden to Marshal the Evidence and 
Has No Duty to Marshal Information Not Contained in the 
Trial Court'a Record 
A. Mr. Cummings7 Depositions Are Not Part of the Record, 
Are Not Evidence, and Cannot Be Considered on Appeal. 
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Cummings has failed to marshal 
all the evidence "from the complete record" in support of the 
Findings of Fact. She argues that the "complete record" includes 
the deposition testimony of Mr. Cummings. Plaintiff goes so far 
as to attach as addenda to her brief apparently the entire 
transcripts of three different deposition sessions of Mr. 
Cummings. Plaintiff's claims, however, are unsupported by any 
citation to authority. Her attempt to improperly supplement the 
record before this Court should not be allowed. 
17
 Defendant Cummings' argument regarding Plaintiff's failure to 
file the depositions is not merely a legalistic attempt to prevail 
based on technicalities. The cites to Mr. Cummings' deposition 
testimony that Plaintiff has attempted to add to the record by 
providing them in her brief on appeal, even if true, are 
insufficient to revive the already infirm and wholly inadequate 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
It is also noteworthy that apart from the cites in Plaintiff's 
brief to her addenda which contain the depositions, she failed to 
cite to the deposition testimony at the evidentiary hearing held 
before Judge Iwasaki, at which time Plaintiff had the unrestricted 
opportunity to proffer as evidence and cite to Mr. Cummings' 
deposition testimony. 
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This Court has recognized that unless a deposition is filed 
with the court, even if it was formally published, it cannot be 
reviewed on appeal. Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assocs., 73 9 P.2d 
634, 641 (Utah App. 1987) (Orme, J., concurring) ("But alas, we 
are unable to determine from the record that the depositions were 
even filed, and for failure of the record to show us otherwise 
respondents have no one to blame but themselves.") (emphasis 
added); accord Alford v. Utah League of Cities & Towns, 791 P.2d 
201, 206 n.3 (Utah App. 1990) ("After reviewing the record, we 
find that no depositions were filed with the district court. In 
resolving an appeal, an appellate court may not consider 
depositions which have not been filed with the district court."); 
see also Rosander v. Larsen, 376 P.2d 146 (Utah 1962) (noting 
that court could not consider depositions in record that were 
still in sealed envelopes because court "must assume that it was 
not considered by the lower court"). 
The trial court's record, which has been compiled and 
indexed by the district court clerk's office, does not contain 
the transcripts of Mr. Cummings' deposition testimony.^ The 
clerk's office has no record of any depositions ever being filed 
11
 Plaintiff's brief fails to cite to the indexed trial court 
record, as required by Rule 24(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
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in this matter.-7 The evidentiary hearing held before Judge 
Iwasaki makes no reference to any of Mr. Cummings' deposition 
testimony and Plaintiff offered none of that testimony at the 
evidentiary hearing to support the Findings of Fact. Hence, the 
deposition testimony of Mr. Cummings is not a part of the record 
on appeal, was not evidence presented for the trial court's 
review, and cannot now be considered on appeal. 
B. Mr. Cummings Has No Duty Under Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure to Have Included in the 
Record the Depositions that Plaintiff Failed to File 
With the Court 
Plaintiff asserts that Mr. Cummings has somehow been 
derelict in his duty under Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure because the depositions of Mr. Cummings are not part of 
the record. Her position is insupportable for at least two 
reasons. First, Mr. Cummings has no duty to create the record 
for Plaintiff. Her failure to file the depositions is not 
something that Mr. Cummings has an obligation to correct. As 
this Court has recently noted, parties who fail to file the 
depositions with the trial court and to make the record so 
indicate "have no one to blame but themselves." Conder, 739 P.2d 
at 641 (Orme, J., concurring). 
-
;
 Although Plaintiff makes the self-serving, unsupported, footnote 
statement that the depositions were left with the trial court at 
the close of the evidentiary hearing, the transcript of that 
hearing makes no mention of any depositions being filed and there 
is absolutely no indication whatsoever in the record that the 
depositions were ever filed. Appellee's Brief at 28 n.4. 
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Second, Rule 11(e)(2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure clearly provides that Mr. Cummings has an obligation to 
provide a "transcript of all evidence relevant to [the] finding 
or conclusion" challenged on appeal. Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2). 
Mr. Cummings did this. He formally requested that Judge 
Iwasaki's court reporter transcribe the evidentiary hearing held 
before Judge Iwasaki so that this Court could review the receipt 
of evidence and the proceedings A1 This evidence, and none 
else, is the relevant evidence for this Court's consideration. 
Rule 11(e)(2) does not, however, impose on Mr. Cummings the 
duty to add documents to the trial court's record that were never 
filed with the court and never introduced as evidence before the 
judge. The mere publication of deposition testimony does not 
make them evidence. Conder, 739 P.2d at 641 (Orme, J., 
concurring). Thus, Mr. Cummings had, and continues to have, no 
duty to include his deposition transcripts in the record-7 nor 
i7
 Mr. Cummings also requested the court reporter to transcribe all 
other hearings before Judge Iwasaki. These transcriptions are part 
of the record. However, except for the March 6, 1995 evidentiary 
hearing, the other proceedings did not involve the receipt of 
evidence. 
-
7
 As the appellate rules correctly point out, it is the clerk of 
the court who is given the task of compiling the record and it is 
appellant's counsel who is given the duty of insuring that the 
relevant portions of the record make it to the court of appeals. 
Neither of these individuals has a duty to add to the record any 
documents that Plaintiff has failed to file with the court. Utah 
R. App. P 11(b), (e). 
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does Mr. Cummings have a duty to marshal his deposition testimony 
as evidence. 
C. The Findings of Fact Are Not Evidence 
Repeatedly in her brief, Mrs. Cummings cites the Findings of 
Fact as support for what the court did. For example, Plaintiff 
asserts that the trial court did review Mr. Posey's report, 
because the Findings of Fact state he did. Brief of Appellee at 
31-32. Plaintiff also states that the corporation did not follow 
corporate formalities, because the Findings of Fact state it did 
not. Id. at 42. 
The Findings of Fact, however, are not evidence of what 
happened. Rather, the Findings of Fact must be supported by, and 
congruent with, the evidence presented to and considered by the 
trial court. Thus, to cite the Findings of Fact as evidentiary 
support for the trial court's actions and decision is circular 
and impermissible.-7 
The focus of this appeal is not on what the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law state; rather, the focus is on whether the 
evidence presented to the trial court supports those Findings and 
-
7
 In this case, counsel for Plaintiff had carte blanche to prepare 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as Mr. Cummings had 
been removed from the proceedings by default. In fact, counsel for 
Plaintiff came to the evidentiary hearing with the Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law already drafted and ready for submission to 
the trial court. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing Before Judge 
Iwasaki on March 6. 1995 at 12:21-25 to 13:1-4. 
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Conclusions .2/ Mr. Cummings asserts that they are wholly 
unsupported or inadequate as the only evidence presented to the 
trial court, and the only evidence before this Court on appeal, 
is the transcript of the brief and incomplete evidentiary hearing 
held before Judge Iwasaki. 
II. Plaintiff's Brief Contains Factual Errors 
A, Mr. Cummings Was Not Allowed to Participate in the 
Evidentiary Hearing 
Plaintiff asserts throughout her brief that Mr. Cummings 
failed to participate, by his own choice, in the evidentiary 
hearing, specifically, that he failed to call the court appointed 
independent expert, Mr. Posey, to testify and failed to introduce 
Mr. Posey's reports as evidence to the Court. 
This argument is unsupported, however, by the record. A 
review of the transcript of the evidentiary hearing held on March 
6, 1995 before Judge Iwasaki clearly demonstrates that Mr. 
11
 Plaintiff states in her brief that Addendum A of Mr. Cummings 
brief should be stricken because it is a continuation of his 
argument and thus exceeds the allowable page limit. Addendum A to 
Mr. Cummings' brief is simply a verbatim restatement of the trial 
court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. As Mr. Cummings 
is challenging the entire Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
inclusion of this information in the addendum is suggested and 
permissible pursuant to Rule 24(a) (11) (C) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
To aid the Court in its review of these Findings and 
Conclusions, Mr. Cummings has included cites to the transcript of 
the evidentiary hearing that support the Findings and Conclusions. 
There is, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, no argument in 
Addendum A. Furthermore, the cites to the record comprise no more 
than 3-4 pages of material and Mr. Cummings had at least that much 
additional space in his brief before exceeding the page limit. 
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Cummings was not allowed to cross-examine witnesses or proffer 
evidence for the court's consideration. Under Utah law, a 
defaulted party should be allowed to at least conduct these 
minimal functions to ensure the fairness of the proceedings. 
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 964 n.12 (Utah 
App. 1989) (noting that "majority of jurisdictions considering 
the procedural rights of a defaulting party have held that the 
defaulting party is entitled to cross-examine witnesses and 
present mitigating evidence"). 
Plaintiff's argument also glosses over the fact that the 
trial court failed to consider the court-appointed expert's 
report and relied, instead, on the subjective, biased, and self-
serving testimony of Mrs. Cummings. Accordingly, it was clear 
error for the trial court to exclude Mr. Cummings from 
participating in the evidentiary hearing. 
B. The Building Is A Corporate Asset 
Plaintiff asserts in her brief that the "building in which 
the business is conducted . . . has never been a corporate asset 
and was titled in the parties' individual names all through the 
divorce proceedings." Brief of Appellee at 44. 
This statement, if left unexplained, would mislead the 
Court. In 1984, Mr. Cummings successfully arranged for Salt Lake 
County to issue Industrial Revenue Bonds, the proceeds of which 
were used to construct the building out of which the candy 
business is operated. The County required Mr. Cummings to 
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incorporate his business at that time as part of the transaction. 
The corporation, not Mr. and Mrs. Cummings, signed the loan 
agreement to repay to the County the loan proceeds generated by 
the industrial revenue bonds. While true that Mr. and Mrs. 
Cummings owned the land prior to the construction of the 
building, they subordinated their interest in the property, as 
part of the transaction, to First Security Bank, as Trustee, to 
be held as collateral and security for the loan agreement. 
Recorded documents evidence these facts. 
Thus, the trial court improperly awarded corporate assets 
and obligations when it awarded ownership of the building and 
land outright to Mrs. Cummings and ordered Mr. Cummings to pay 
the loan secured by the land and building. 
III. Default Was Not Appropriate 
In Plaintiff's brief, she cites the case of Marshall v. 
Marshall, 915 P.2d 509 (Utah App. 1996) as support for her 
argument that the trial court's decision to default Mr. Cummings 
was appropriate. 
The facts of Marshall, however, are inapposite to the facts 
of this case. In Marshall, the husband intentionally withheld 
information from the court regarding his assets and attempted to 
hide those assets so that the court could not reach them for 
inclusion in the marital estate. This led to the appellate 
court's statement that the judicial system is not to be 
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manipulated by one who actively and aggressively misleads the 
court and opposing party. 
In the instant case, however, Judge Iwasaki noted in open 
court that Mr. Cummings had "substantially complied" with the 
court's orders.-7 Mr. Cummings has never tried to shield or 
hide assets of the marital estate. He did, for various reasons, 
respond late to some of Plaintiff's discovery requests. But Mr. 
Cummings has always responded. Plaintiff's complaints to the 
court regarding Mr. Cummings' noncompliance were generally lodged 
only after Plaintiff deemed Mr. Cummings' initial responses 
insufficient. 
In any event, to strike Mr. Cummings' Answer after 2 1/2 
years of proceedings was extremely harsh. As noted by the 
Marshall court, 
"The striking of pleadings, entering of default, and 
rendering of judgment against a disobedient party are the most 
severe of the potential sanctions that can be imposed upon a 
nonresponding party." Because of the severity of this type of 
sanction, "the trial court's range of discretion is more narrow 
than when the court is imposing less severe sanctions." 
Marshall, 915 P.2d at 515 (emphasis added)(quoting Utah Dep't of 
Transp. v. Osguthorpe, 892 P.2d 4, 7 & 8 (Utah 1995)). The trial 
court had several, less severe, options before it. It could have 
-
7
 On a related point, all of the orders attached as addenda to 
Appellee's Brief are unsigned copies rather than copies from the 
indexed record of the orders signed by the court. While the 
unsigned orders are presumably the same as the signed copies, it 
nonetheless is an added inconvenience to both the Court and 
Defendant who must compare the unsigned copies with the signed 
copies to ensure their accuracy. 
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restricted Mr. Cummings' ability to enter evidence on those 
topics about which he had not responded to the court's 
satisfaction or it could have found him in contempt of court. 
See Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b). It did neither. Rather than using 
one of these less drastic and permanent measures, the court chose 
the most severe measure--default. 
The court chose default despite the fact that the court 
appointed expert's report had been received almost seven months 
prior to the entry of default.-7 This report, along with the 
knowledge obtained by the court appointed expert, provided enough 
11
 Mrs. Cummings erroneously indicates to the Court that the 
appraisal report of Mr. Posey was not presented to the trial court 
until the time of the evidentiary hearing in March 1996. Plaintiff 
has obviously not reviewed the trial court's indexed record which 
contains the original envelope, still sealed by order of the court, 
in which Mr. Posey's appraisal and report was sent to the trial 
court. That envelope has a postmark date of September 1, 1994 and 
a stamp from the district court dated September 7, 1994. Thus, the 
trial court clearly had this relevant and critical piece of 
information for almost seven months prior to the entry of Mr. 
Cummings' default. 
As to the second report filed by Mr. Posey, Plaintiff alleges 
that this report was originally filed in the fall of 1994 but was 
defective. There is no evidence in the record of any report by Mr. 
Posey being filed with the court in the fall of 1994 other than the 
appraisal referenced above. If true, it obviously supports Mr. 
Cummings' position that he was attempting to comply with the trial 
court's orders. 
In any event, the second report filed by Mr. Posey that is 
still sealed in the court's record is accompanied by a cover letter 
from Mr. Spafford's office dated February 28, 1995, prior to the 
evidentiary hearing. That letter indicates that Mr. Posey's report 
covers the period from September 1, 1992 to December 31, 1994. 
Given the coverage of this report, it is unlikely that it was filed 
in the fall of 1994. Furthermore, the letter states that it 
accompanies a sealed envelope containing Mr. Posey's report and is 
being submitte_d to the court by Mr. Cummings' attorneys. 
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objective and detailed information that the court could have 
fairly divided the marital estate, even though Mr. Cummings had 
not fully complied with all of the outstanding discovery 
requests. Consequently, the trial court's decision to strike Mr. 
Cummings' Answer and enter his default was an abuse of the narrow 
discretion afforded to trial courts when entering default 
judgments. See Marshall, 915 P.2d at 515. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and presented in Appellant's 
initial brief, Appellant respectfully requests that this Court 
set aside the default entered by the trial court and remand the 
case to be tried on its merits. Furthermore, even if this Court 
declines to set aside the default, Appellant respectfully 
requests that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law be 
remanded for the taking of further evidence by the trial court, 
that Mr. Cummings be allowed to participate in those proceedings, 
and that the trial court be required to review and use the court 
appointed expert's reports and testimony in dividing the marital 
estate. Finally, Defendant requests that this Court decide the 
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merits of his appeal without oral argument 
DATED this day of August, 1996. 
M. Byron Fisner 
James F. Wood 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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